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CHANCE FOR THE CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMY? 
l. lntroduction 
In the course of last two Years practically all the 
European countries connected with a common political 
perspective during the period of four decades, as well as 
with the centrally planned character of their economies, 
have undergone principal changes. While analysts, 
specialists in national economy and politicians are racking 
th~ir brains where, i.e. in what direction the ecohomies and 
politics in this part of the world are óeveloping, anó what 
it will bring for the world economy, just a little space is 
• given to searching for the answer to the question concerning 
the basic causes for this historical change. Bocialist 
economy found itself in crises in spitr of the efforts for 
·its reform which have been going on since the late fifties. 
None of those reforms. however, managed to produce long-term 
satisfactory results. 
In the CSFR and other neighbouring countries, failure of 
the economic reforms to date is being extensively discussed . 
• 
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There are various views of the causes, including the 
question whether the political structures in power were 
involved at all in reforming or if the present-day nature of 
socialist economy mal' be reiormed. 
The findings so far confirm the idea that this is the 
case 01 a more eNte-rrsive crisis r"e.ther than an economic Cine, 
and its solution is closely connected with dealing with a 
lot Di political problems, which were neglected and put 
aside, further with removing the residues oi totalitarian 
regimes, with the development 01 democracy and ~ Fluralistic 
soc:iety. 
It is from this point oi view that the contemporar)' 
changes in Eastern Europe open UP space for radical economic 
reiorms and a faster transition to a market economy. Its 
sueeess is 90ing tel be afiected in each cDLlntry by the 
initial situation oi domestic economy. 
My intention is to indicete chief 1aetors, which may 
act as retarding or acceleratiDng 1ectors en the development 
Di the Cz..echo-Slovak national economy. Thi= is't by no rneans 
a simple task (in the period when "the residues 01 the 
political system breaking to pieces cannot be seen beeause 
of the dust covering it"). 
Moreover, it is understandable that a wide range of 
economic problems, as well as a part Di the terminology used 
in the COLlntr ies developing on 
socio-e-conomic bases, 
/ 
are iOLlnd 
completely different 
by economists and 
theoreticians as something new and strange. In spite of this 
it asstimed that the present factography and my views may 
stimulate the interest in real historica! processes going on 
in Central Euro pe and which may effect the position of this 
continent within the world economy in near future. The paper 
deals with the analysis of the selected internal anti 
external conditions for the CSFR's possible return among 
adYanc~d economies and a draft 01 the economic reform 
scenario proposed . 
• 
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11. Internal conditions 
We are heading for the road that has never been 
walked through'by anyone and some have already 
managed to get stuck in it. However if we Mant to 
return to a technologically advanced Morid not as 
the poor relations, bowing in humiliation and 
sqeezing a cap under their arms , but as egua} and 
pro5pering partners, Me have to create crucial 
pre-conditions i1 Dur intentions are to come t,Mue. 
IBasic features 01 the CSFR strategy in the period 
oi transition from the centrally planned econom)' 
to the market one, Prague 1990). 
A sudden collapse of the East European countries' poli-
tical systems has resulted in the rise Di 8 new sense in 
developing economic cooperetion between East and West. 
Well-known periodieals anti prognoses of leading experts on 
l'East pr~blems't abound with various views 01 the development 
01 cooperation Di the two economic blocs facing each other 
ano individual countries of the hitherto completely 
dif1erent political systems. 
Sorne of these foreeasts are imbued with considerable 
optimism, other are rather care1ul,and they point to a still 
vague tendency of merely gradual increase in mutual trust 
in the eeonomic sphere. Just a few out 01 the thousands of 
." 
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entrepreneurs who visited our country on business were. 
however, able to understand that in the course of four 
decades, the' CSFR pursued the co~\rse. which, aided by a 
sophisticated political system, suppressed somethin9 in man 
that had been accumulated in the course of almost a hundred -
year development: from the times 01 industrial revolution 
down to the scientific and technol09ical revolution, with 
itE favourable, as well as shady sides. A gradL\al wind-up 01 
material incentives, continuous efforts for the implementa-
tion of political sl09ans and universal equality, imposition 
01 the one-party monopo}y in power, step by step, managed tD 
eradicate the priorities from our national economy that are 
brou9ht b)' economic competition, the law of the market, the 
continuous fight for competitiveness and an efficient 
activity of each firm and its employees. 
Gradually, the world becomes persuaded that in spite of 
a general economic backwardness, Czecho-Slovakia has B 
supply of mainly intelleetual abilities at their disposal. 
but when coníronted with other East-block eountries, with B 
number of other comparative advantages. They are as follows: 
, 
1. a lon9-term industrial tradition 
2. hi9hly-educated labour force, for whom the favourable 
entrepreneurial boom expected means a powerful motivation 
~. further, an advantageous ge09raphical loeation conneeted 
with a hUge historie and cultural wealth. 
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Key figures in 1989 
Table No 1 
------------------------------------------------------------
Bulg. a Ruman. a Hung. Czech. a PoI. USSRa 
------------------------------------------------------------
GNP ($ bn. ) 41.5 70.9 29.0 50.7 59.8 1258.(1 
GNP growth ( !. i -0.4 -1.5 0.5 -2.4 -2.5 
POPLtlation (mn. ) 8.9 23.2 10.6 15.6 37.9 293.0 
GNP capita ($ ) 466:', 3()~16 2762 :3'.250 1~.78 4293 
lr.flation ( ¡; ) 17. (> 640.0 
E>:ports ($ bn. ) 2.5 6.8 6 ') . ~ 5.8 8.5 26.0 
lmports ($ bn. ) '" " ..... ..J 5.0 5.6 5.6 7.7 32. El 
Trade balance ( ~ bn ) -1 . (¡ 1.8 0.6 0.2 0.8 -6. ~, 
Current Bec. i$ bn) -1.5 1.5 -O. ~, -ü.5 -0.5 -4.5 
[lebt ($ bn. ) 10.8 0.3 20.0 7.9 41.4 52.4 
Debt in ¡; GNP 26.0 0.0 69.0 15.6 69.2 4.2 
[tebt/e>:port 4.3 0.0 7 '> ... \. ,.:.. 1.4 4.9 2.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------
al lt should be noted thBt the difference in GNPs with the 
West will increase i1 local currencies are devalued 
further vis-.-vis the U.S. dollar. At the same time, the 
debt ratios will be under increased pressure. 
Source: Economist lntelligence Unit." WIIW. 
, 
The CS~R's industrial cBPacity made it one of the 
leading countries in the world. In the course 01 the last 
tVlenty years, however, the structural profiJe on the level 
01 the sectors in the economy diverged irom a typical 
structural profile, and its development in the 
proces. of economic development, connected with the national 
character of the market economy. An excessive weight 01 
• 
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importance of manufacturing industry is documented in Table 
No 2, 'indicating the share of the selected total resources 
flowing into the industrial (manufacturingl sector, in 
comparison with advanced capitalist countries. 
Share 01 Industry in Production Resources and Creation of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 80's (in percentagel
'
/ 
ernployment 
energy 
investments 
import 
GDP creatic1n 
CSFR 
::'·8 
E!9 
35 
87 
37 
Table No 2 
o major industrial 
countries 
25 
37 
24 
40 
28 
Source: Round-up Prognosis 01 Development of the Czecho-
Slovak Economy l\P to the Year 201(>, Praglle 1989. 
1/ The share of engineering in GDP formation i5 estimated at 
16 per cent (major industrialized countries: 7 - 8 per 
centl, services 8 - 9 per cent eln comparison with 45 
62 per centl, metallurgy, 3, 6 per cent el X),agriculture 
18 per cent e3 - 5 Xl. 
At present the Czecho-Slovak national economy has at iis 
disposal a most e>:tensive fixed assti?t base. Its value is 
estimated at 4 - 5 trillion Cs. crowns, and ~n terms of its 
share per employee it may be hard to find its rival in the 
world. On the other hand, the age gf most machines and 
equipment averages 11 years, but may sometimes reach even 
• 
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60 70 years, anti the level oi wear - and - tear is 
considerable. 
The size and structure oi Czechoslovakia's engineering 
industry Was accelerated aiter World War Two due to the fact 
that Czechoslovaf;ia had become the "10rging and engineering 
plant" helping to renovate East European economies, 
including that 01 the Soviet Unior,. To .. ards the end c,i the 
1970s and at the beginning oi the 1980s, this country's 
engineering industry was invigorated by another massive 
impulse in the iorm 01 large-scale Soviet purchases in 
ior IIpetroroubles": Gr é'.dua 11 y an e}~tensi ve 
engineering comple>~ has evolved, cDmpri5ed tOday of 300 
cOffipanies that group 800 plants, employ 1 05(l 000, and use 
an enormous production potential. However. their overall 
technical level is quite low. Ir, 1987, semi-aL.to,roated ar,d 
fully automated program-controlled machines and equipment 
accounted ior 23.6 per cent and 26.3 per cent oi the total 
stock 01 machinery in industry and engineering respectively. 
The technico-economic parameters Di nearly 70 per cent 01 
the machines used in the engineering industry today reflect 
the tect-,n~cal standard of the ii,-st half 01 the 196(>s .• Tt-,is 
great moral and physical obsole~cence cd engineerin9 
industry's equipment - aged 18 years on the average - can be 
clearly se en in the quality and cost-intensity 01 
production, while the decisive engineering technologies are 
the oldest of all - the age oi machine tools in 2(> years, 
forming machines 20.6 years and thermalprocessing machinery 
21.8 years • 
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The scope of production funds in Czechoslovakia does 
not permit an incraase in the over-all level oi sh~it 
- Mork. ranging approximately betMeen 1,2 - 1,3 that is. one 
oi the 10Mest in the Morld. Asad technical condition Di 
machinery reflects an overall structural deiormation. 
resulting irom the previous practice oi enforcing large-size 
Di iirms by force, cOIT.bines and bureacracy. central 
regulation 01 production in iirm. price planning and proiit 
redi str i butic-n. This resulta in de10rming the economic 
mechanism tr'íough a low motivatiDrl of econclmic subjects for 
the eificiency 01 motivation. 
This led to a 10M rationality Di the 9verall creation 
and consumption 01 national producto to a disproportionately 
high prOdL\ction consumption~U 1 production investments and 
iinally. to suppressing a rational pat teín cd per-sona 1 
conslJmption. 
When it comes to personal consumption, the latter is 
most deiormed by excessive expenses ior ioodstu1is (even 
under conditions 01 high prite subsidies from the state 
budget LIP to 1990): iurther. by an insLlfiicient supply and 
quality oi services and consumer goods. The volume Di 
subsidiares in Czechoslovakia in 1989 Mas over 52 bilion 
crOMn. The contemporary share Di expenditures 10r ioodstuif 
2/ For 1000 USD oi the created GNP aboLlt 21 GJ of primary 
energy is being consLlmed in CSFR (that is 8 GJ in major 
industrialized cOLlntries), 104 ~,g Di raM steel is being 
prodLlced and 77 kg is being consumed (26 and 29 k9). 7 kg 
of cement is being produced (4 kg), 97 brutto tkm of 
cargo railMay transportation is being consumed (175 tkm), 
etc. 
- lO -
eNceeds 42 per cent of total incomes. For cLIltLlre and 
tOllrism 8 - 10 per cent is spent, for manLlfactllred consllmer 
goods lO - 12 per cent. Accordlng to available data, these 
vallles, in the former case exceed by 100 per cent; in the 
second and third cases, they are by 70 - 80 per cent smaller 
in comparison with the division 01 the consllmption basket in 
other industrialized cOllntries. 
Another e>: tensi ve, thollgh inef1iciently exploited 
resource, which is being wasted in the process 01 GDP 
creation, is the labollr force. Nowadays there are 8 million 
inhabitants employed (51,5 per cent out 01 the total number 
01 inhabitantsl with qllalificBtions among the highest in 
Europe. The average length 01 the work week being 42,5 hOllrs, 
the nllmber of hours worked per inhabitant amount::. 
approximately to 940 - 950, annually. 
On the other hand, the Czecho-Slovak level of wages and 
salaries is considerably lower, ranging on the border 01 
1,5 - 3 USD per hour, as compared with 8 - 10 USD in Western 
Europe. In contrast to advanced economies, the labour forcE 
in the ~SFR is allocated in the first place to sectors of 
physical in particlllar, the manu1acturing 
industry. Services arE sEverely under - represented. 
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Employment Structure in the CSFR and Selected Industrialized 
Countries by Major Industry in the year 1985 (X) 
Table No 3 
CSFR DC's CSFR - DC's 
Agriculture and forestry 12,5 6,0 + 6,5 
Engineering and metallurgy 
of nonferrous metal s 13,(1 7,8 + 5",2 
Light indLlstry 9,9 6,4 + 3,5 
Civil engineering 6,7 7,0 + 1 ,7 
Services 8,~1 42,0-62,5 
Sourc:e: Calculations of the Prognostic In.titute of the 
Czechoslovak Academy of Seiences, Prague. 
Considerable differences in most foreign as well as 
domestic professional sourees are due to social elements of 
employment causing lower work morale rather than an 
e.sentially lower technical level. 
AnotKer factor which unfavourably affeeted the value of 
the labour force in the long run was a deformed demand for 
qualified labour. Qualification was understood in terms of 
its .nominal characteristics rather than its real results. 
Appointing the so-called "nomenclature cadres· with the 
neeessary poli tieal profile to top posts deterred 
employees from the effort to achieve higher efficiency or to 
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do quality work for their qualifications, and this, in turn, 
deformed not only demand for a qualified labour force, but 
also its choices and the level of training for this 
qualification. These trends were multiplied by two massive 
waves of political repressions, aiter the years 1948 and 1968, 
and a forthcoming emigration wave of top technical and other 
cadres. 
Even in spite 01 these aspects, the ef1iciency 
parameters of Czecho-Slovak economy, living from its 
tradition and manual skills, Were quite high until the 
middle 70's and in comparison with other centrally planned 
economies' production and export results, were good until the 
beginning of the 80's. 
The mentioned drawbacks in the running oi the CSFR 
national economy resulted in an increasing manufacture Di 
low-quality goads. In the period of carelessness, the 
mechanism 01 planned balances was unable to meet the needs 
of the domestic market as well as the CMEA market, and the 
phenomenom 01 ~aste was increasingly manifested. 
In many firms the rate 01 rejects was caleulated in 
percentage and production was classified approximately into 
three qualitative eategories: export to eapitalist 
eountries. to socialist eountries and standard products Di 
the lowest quality. destined for the domestie market. 
"The tender revolution" which made an essential 
breakthrough in the CSFR's place and relation in the world 
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economy, created sufficiently strong incentives for the 
governments of leading countries, foreign capital, 
engineering and consulting companies and individual 
entrepreneurs to become interested in our economy. They are 
finding considerable chances for their successful operation 
in the CSFR. The firms coming with the expectation to 
achieve fast profits are ~oming across several problems with 
which they are familiar from developing countries. 
Besides demand for new machines and technologies an 
extensive domestic production base may be activated only at 
the expense of considerable investments in the construction 
Di modern infrastructures, connecting it with information 
and telecommucation systems, creating efficient iinance and 
banking systems, as well as education and training of 
qualified personnel for marketing, public relations, 
activities in the area of foreign commercial operations, 
consulting, etc. 
Some foreign businessmen expect to find a position in a 
huge Soviet market unsaturated with goods, through their 
involvement in the Czecho-Slovak economy; and that via 
extensive claims of the Czecho-Slovak economy on raw-material 
imports from the USSR, they will be able to find a channel 
of transferring their yields into the CSFR, from where the 
Yields could be transformed back to their owners at 
a smaller risk. This way seems to be most promising in the 
period of long-term favourable boom and "overheating" mainly 
in West - European and Japanese economies 
exception, 
/ 
these problems are 
(Germany is an 
solved through 
• 
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confederation with the erstwhile Socialist part of the 
country which was separated by force). Moreover. several of 
our firms established cooperation and other production ties 
and contacts in the country of their biggest business 
partner in the CQurse of four decades and even in the 
future. 
The last important are a which is in urgent need 01 
cooperation i5 environmental creation and protection. In 
terms of quantifiable factors of the acope of environmental 
pollution. our country ranks at the top among European 
countries with the figures often several ,times exceeding 
accepted norms~/. Thia resulta in the low life-expectancy 
01 our inhabitants. among the loweat in Central Europe. 
which is however due to our share of the overall level 01 
airo water and soil pollution. 
Most foreign partners stipulate their financial or 
material help to the CSFR with their own preferential 
allDcation to the Brea Df the environment. This ia due nDi 
only to its considerable depreciation all oyer Central 
EUrope but also in Scandinavian countries. as well as due to 
, 
the fact that eCDlogical aspects are reflected in the 
measures taken by central natione! economic regulation too 
slowly and inconsistently, in spite of a number 01 
negotiations on the subject. 
3/ The CSFR is in second place in 
sulphur dioxide emissions per kmz 
the biggest polluters in Europe . 
terms 01 the 
and in third 
volume Di 
place among 
• 
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Causes of the unfavoL\r-abl e envir-onmental living 
conditions ma)' be sought not only in economic developments 
char-acter-istic of a rising tension between available 
mater-ial Or- financial r-esour-ces, but also in a distor-ted 
consciousness of a decisive part of wor-kers in management 
pr-omoting the long-ter-m pr-efer-ential policy of heavy-tonnage 
pr-oductions and being only 
si tL\ation. 
for-mally liable for- their-
The stake taken by our- pr-evious gover-nment in the 
spher-e 01 supplying the economy with energ)', i.e. building 
nuclear - power- stations on the basis of the Soviet VVER -
440 and VVER - 1000 types, called forth a justified pr-otest on 
the par-t of Austr-i~, Ger-many and other- countries. The 
consequences of the Cher-nobyl br-eakdown necessitated ~he 
entire pr-ogramme to be r-e-assessed. In cooperation with the 
manufactur-er-s fr-om leading industrialized countr-ies, new 
elements have been found, secur-ing the safety of their 
oper-ation; or these r-esources have been r-eplaced by some 
other, safer ones. 
Sinc!? the issue of envir-onmental quality and the 
unfavourable effects of pollution is not limited by national 
and political bor-der-s, this ar-ea is going to be one of the 
fir-st ones for co-oper-ation in spite ot the differ-ent 
Eastern and Wester-n views of it as yet, indicating the 
existence of two hitherto differ-ent political systems. This 
area might become one of the groundstones of the new unified 
(common) Eur-opean house • 
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111. External conditions 
The speed and scope of the pc!itical integration 
of Czecho-Slovakia into an overali European framework 
and into the world economy is going to be markedly 
dependent on resol ving the econorr,ic aspec t of this 
process. On the one hand, conditi~ns for the fastest 
pO!:,.sible change of material and proprietan' . 
structures and the technical leve! 01 the production 
base have to be e reo. ~ed SimL\ 1 taneouE·l y; 
on the other hand, conditions fo~ the application 
of new technologies and the findings of world-wide 
research, and, finally, for an overall increase 
in export capacity must be creBted. The hitherto 
exceedingly one-sided orientation oi the Czecho-
Slovak foreign-trade structure is to be replaced 
wi th the orientation to the widest possible 
cooperatio,", ",¡ith all countries-.:.n the world, in 
particular, however, with bur European neighbouíS. 
The structure and efficiency of the CSFR's external 
economic relations has been unfavoL\rably affected by the 
period of almost four decades of extensive economic growth, 
in the COLlrSe of which our economy becBme an e,:porter of 
low technology products and materials produced on a large 
scale, and an importer of predominantly heavy industry 
• 
l 
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products. Since 1960 the share of raw materials and semi-
finished goods in Czecho-Slovak imports stepped UP from 
43 X to 62 X. Consumer goods practically disappeared from 
our imports. The CSFR was gradLlall y being driven out of 
demanding markets in the non-socialist area and oriented to 
less eNacting markets in the centrally planned economies. 
These unfavourable tendencies resulted among other things 
in the decline of purchasing power of Czecho-Slovak exports 
(Terms of Trade declined to 66,6 X in the period 1970-1986). 
In the sphere 01 final production, in 1985 the CSFF: 
exchanged 3,86 kg of her exports fer 1 kg of importE from 
Germany. Belgium exchanged 0,75 experts for 1 kg of imports, 
Switzerland - 0,76 for 1 kg. At the same time, however, the 
volume of Swiss merchandise to Germany was 16,7 times 
higher in that year. As a result of a permanently 10Mer 
growth rate of Czecho-Slovak exports, the share of the 
CSFR in world exports declined from 1,61 Z ir, the fifties· 
to 0,9 X in the eighties. External economic relations became 
thus a retarding factor and a channel of immense economic 
losses and downgrading of the national product rather than a 
factor of growth. Some calculations confirm that merely as 5 
result of failing to achieve the prices planned and oiten 
exporting for prices that did not even cover factory costa 
of the exports, from $ 300 to 500 million USD was lost 
annually. The capability of the r,ational economy for 
transformation was also decreasing in the course of the 
eighties. For instance, in the year 1987, 1 Kes of imported 
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fuels, raw materials and mat~rials corresponded to only 
1,43 K~s of value added. 
The impacts of this unfavourable development on the 
entire economy are most serious. They appear practically in 
all areas oi our ioreign-trade relations, as well as in our 
domestic economy. lt is not only the question oi the geogra-
phical and technological pattern oi trade, eificiency oi 
import-export relations, the increasing tension in trade and 
payment balances, but -it is also the practical 
inability to meet the demands ior imports ior personal 
consumption, as well es production consumption. This in turn 
results in breakdowns in supplies, and eNe~ts en unfavourable 
impact on an overall socio-political climate in the country. 
- 19 -
Czechoslovakia: Exports and Imports by main directions 
1970-1989 (Value, billion US dollars) 
Table No 4 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989 
E~,port: 
I-lor 1 d 3,79 8,36 14,93 17,47 22,99 14,40 
EEC-East 2,43 5,47 8,46 11,28 16,87 7,70 
EEC-I.Jest 0,92 1,97 3,82 3,39 4,16 ~t,02 
Other 0,43 0,92 1,64 1 ,80 1,96 1,68 
Import: 
World: 3,70 9,09 15,18 17,55 23,24 14,24 
EEC-East 2,3~, 5,8=1 9,83 13,09 17,20 7,75 
EEC-West 1 , 01 2,52 4,21 3,22 4,59 4,87 
Other 0,35 (l,71 1,14 1,24 1,45 1,62 
Source: Economic Survey of Europe in 1989-1990, UN N.Y. 1990 
national foreign trade statistics. 
EEC-East = east European countries 01 CMEA and the 
Soviet Union 
EEC-West = EEC market economies and Japan 
Other - all remaining countries 
Note: Higher shares 01 the ECE- East countries as indicated 
by official Czecho-Slovak data, e.g. 1987 - 78,7 -... '" , 
are, however di1ficult to compare in view 01 dif1erent 
currencies and their fictivious exchange rates. 
An unfavourable, insufficiently diversi1ied development 
01 the geographical structure 01 forei9n trade is the outcome 
01 a gradually increased political orientation 01 10reign-
, 
\ 
- 20 -
trade ties with socialist countries, in particular with the 
Soviet Union. The absence of a domestic raw-materials base 
caused the Czecho-Slovak economy to re-orientate to the 
market of the main supplier of raw-material inputs, which,as 
a result of a chronically unsaturated internal market, forced 
Czecho-Slovak producers to produce standard consumer goods in 
maximum volumes. 
This trend, unfavourably affected since 1974 b)' 
increasing prices of raw materials and fuels on the world 
markets, was reflected with some delay through the flexible 
five-year average - in the necessity of a continuously rising 
volume of exports in return for a declining physical volume 
of imports, particularly of oi1 4 '. 
This deterioration in real e>:change relations 
aggravated by a low level of value added to material inputs, 
resulted in an ever increasing tension between the 
stagnating import volume oi raw-materials inputs and a 
growing volume 01 physic.l exports. The structure of foreign-
I 
trade merchandise deviated more .nd more irom the long-term 
intentions plannned, as well as from the structure, 
01 successfully operating national economies with a similar 
initial material and technical basis. 
4/ In the CMEA member countries' mutual trade the so-called 
contractual prices based on the arithmetical average of 
world prices in the course oi the preceding five years. 
For example, in 1986. the average prices oi commodities in 
the period 1981-1985 were used. This approach was to help 
to remove the deviations resulting froro boom or 
speculation in current world prices. Since 1989 the 
current world prices havq been used. 
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Commodity structure of Czechoslovak 
Foreign Trade (in percent) 
TotC\l 01 ~¡hich: 
I. 
NC\chinery C\nd 
eQLlÍpment 
11. . 
Fuels, rC\w mC\te-
riC\l C\nd mC\teriC\ls 
I 1 1. 
Food,,·tLd fs inc. 
raw material:· 
IV. 
Non-foc,dstLlffs 
goods for 
comsL\lTIption 
1965 
10(> 
48, ::1 
30,4 
4,6 
16,5 
E X POR T 
1970 1975 198(' 
10(> lOO 100 
50,2 48,0 50,2 
29,4 30,3 29,7 
:::.,9 4,3 
16,5 17,4 15,8 
TabIe No 5 
1985 19E8 
10(> 10ü 
57,4 
24,6 ::,,7 
:::;.,7 
15,4 
==~========================================================== 
I N P O R T 
-------------------------------------------------------------
TotC\l of ~¡hich 
1 • 
~lC\c: hiner)' and 
eQLlipment 
-11. 
FLlels, ra\ll me.te-
riel:- and ITIC\teriC\l 
11 J. 
FoodstLdfs inc. 
rC\~¡ mC\teriC\l 
IV. 
Non-foodstuffs 
goods for 
comsL\ption 
lOO 
29,9 
48,9 
16,0 
5,2 
10(> 10(> lOO lOO lOO 
33,3 36,9 36,6 34,4 41,6 
43,1 46,6 48,7 53,6 4~!,9 
15, 1 9,3 8,8 6,3 5,8 
8,5 7,2 5,9 5,7 6,7 
Source: FC\cts on Czec:hoslovC\k Foreign TrC\de, ChC\mbe,.. of 
COlTlmerce C\nd Industry. PrC\gue 1989. 
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Long-term tension was caused by imposing a policy of 
centralized foreign-trade regulation and its directive 
orientation to eMPorting firms, which, as a result of their 
monopolistic position in the domestic market, continuously 
unsaturated market and a small export efficiency, found 
it disadvantageous. to e>:port their goods. Anc,ther-
unfavourable influence which carne to be felt was that of the 
erroneous Czecho-Slovak economic strategy based on the 
assumption that scientific and. technological development 
could be achieved primarily from internal resources. This 
of re-inventing the wheeland increased, rather- than 
decreased the distance of our- economy from the world 
technological level. In the spher-e of for-eign trade, the 
imposition of this tendency was increasingly reflected in 
the effort to maximize the growth of raw-materials impor-ts 
with compensation by all kinds of home-made pr-oducts that 
the foreign partner might be interested in. That was not 
a difiicult task tp cope with until 1987, especially in the 
case oi the Soviet Union, which chr-onically iailed to meet , 
the needs oi the domestic market even with essential goods. 
A1ter- this per-iod, however-, the impact 01 decr-easing wcr-ld 
prices 01 materials came to be 1elt. 
On the other hand, a number 01 economic 2nd political 
"Western inter-ventions" in the cSFR economy, as well as 
other centrall y planned economies broLIght aboLlt remarkabl e 
economic damage. The COCO M activities, which wiped out the 
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possibilities Di mutual exchange Di goods between the East 
and the West may be mentioned as an example. Despite the 
protests Di mainly West-European firms, which lost their 
contracts oi tens oi milliard USD, political interests were 
given priority till the end Di 1989. American businessmen 
themselves calcL.lated the loss resulting irorn COCON 
disapproval Di deals in 1987 at 10 mld USD. It is hard to 
calculate the losses Di a technological gap and the overall 
lag in science and technology in the CSFR and other 
countries. It may be assumed that the removal Di the iron 
curtain, restoration Di the most-iavoured-nation clause and 
the INF membership, as well as the global adjustment Di 
political relations will iorever eliminate the residues oi 
the cold war irom the sphere Di mutual contacts. 
The long-term eiiort ior maintaining the widest possible 
range in the assortment of manuiactured goods resulted (in 
1987) in the situation that as much as 75 Z Di the world 
industrial production assortment was produced in the CSFR, 
while domestic firms found it increasingly diiiicult to cope 
with the eiiectiveness barrier • 
• A vague approach to pricing and exchange-rate criteriB 
and an almost complete absence Di the international moveeent 
of production factors ended up in misorientation in the area 
Di outputs and costs in international economic coope,ration, 
mainly in recent years. In spite oi the official statistical 
data indicating approximately a one-third share Di so called 
"specialized production" in the CMEA member countries' 
toreign trade, in tact, this share was about 10 ~. The data 
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indicated by the advanced EEC countries are about 50 - 55 Z. 
Most trade agreements were calculated on the government 
level, and the firms only received directively determined 
e>:port c¡uotas. Inputs were allc,cated by input-output 
planning ("economie balance") so that firms had an incentive 
to ma>:imize their production cost by mean s of bureaucratic 
procedures, which, in turn, were reflected in factory costs 
a~d export prices. 
This state of affairs caused Czecho-Slovak firms to 
lose interest in the price levels on the world market, and 
consec¡uently also in the efficiency of their labour, in 
increasing the c¡ualification of the labour force, in 
introdwcing brainwork elements into labour and in updating 
production output and methods. 
The tendency to magnifying the physical volume flowing 
through the n?tional economy came to be increasingly 
reflected in the foreign trade results. Through processing 
this physical volume c¡uite a small share of value is added 
to change the material for final use. Imports amount to 
roughly ~5 million tons of goods at the average value of 
almost 400 USO per "ton" into the Czecho-Slovak prcduction 
process. On the other hand, via export, 26 mil. tons at an 
average value of almost sbo USO per a ton will be lost. 
Export and import volumes of SI mil. tons generate turnover 
valued at 41 mld USO. 
AII of the mentioned eharaeteristics of our standing in 
the international division of labour ereate a powerful 
./ 
• 
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external disequilibrium resulting in deficit on the trade 
and capital accounts. 11 it had not been 10r the central 
influence on the development of trade, the disequilibrium 01 
'payments and the scope 01 indebtedness would have been 
considerably higher. 
Cumulative balance 01 the CSFR trade balance 
in 1ive-year periods 
Table No 6 
CSFR-CNEA CSFR-[lVC's CSFR-[iC'" 
1961-65 + 488 - 161 + 213 
1966-70 - 151 296 + 467 
1971-75 130 
-
1480 + 641 
1976-80 - 1869 3558 + 1433 
1981-85 - 2652 233 + 3191 
1986-88 
-
347 1232 + 1264 
In 1989, Trade with non-sociaiist countries increased 
considerably while its business with the so-called sociali"t 
countries declined. The effectiveness of trade in terms 01 
bar ter relations improved, and the country began te 
cooperate with foreign companies on a broader basis. A 
number 01 enterprises with 10reign capital participation 
were established. Czechoslovakia's 10reign trade turnover 
increaced by 2,1 per cent; its trade with socialist 
countries dropped by 2,2 cent and that with 
• 
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non-socialist sta tes increased by 9,8 per ~ent. In 1989, as 
in previous years, Czechoslovakia's balance of trade showed 
a surplus, amounting to 2,800 million crowns. At the Sol me 
time, its trade with non-market economies resulted in a 
deficit totalling 1,500 million crowns. In trade .with 
market-economy countries Czechoslovakia had a sL,rplus 
amounting to 4,300 million crowns (of this amount, 1,100 
mili ion crowns resulted froro trade with industrialized 
countries, with which its last surpluses were in 1984 and 
1985S/ • 
While assessing revolutionary changes in Central and 
EaE·tern Europe, a number of foreign commentators emphasize 
that a practical disruption of the political system in this· 
part of the world is a result of the social influence 01 
Western countries and of a sUbjective factor. However, 
neither of these two factors could have produced any effect 
if it had not be en for serious economic and foreign-trade 
problems, which the previous regime was unable to resolve 
successful1y. 
Fast-growing problems in separate economies in Eastern 
, 
Europe were increasingly reflected in their extensive 
foreign-trade tieso The Soviet Union curbed the export of 
raw meterials and fuels, which, in turn, brought about a 
deterioration in the supplies and production in small 
European countries. The goods manufactured could not be 
marketed - even on alternative markets, which, again, 
5/ Czechoslovakia's engineering industry at a crossroad 
Czechoslovak Foreigr. Trade, F'rog. 111.~91 • 
, 
, 
, 
• 
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produced other problems. In 1990 the fuels and energy 
price inputs 01 the CSFR increased by over 501 and a further 
increase is expected at the beginnin~ of the year 1991. 
As it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will be able to 
deliver the quota 01 raw material s agreed, the CSFR turns to 
her partners, debtor and other countries, which export oil 
CIraq, Mexico, Venezuela, et al.l. 
A wide range 01 problems, some of which have been 
mer,tioned, call for the necessity of adopting a complex of 
meBsures in foreign trade. When flexibly incorporated in the 
global reform process, these measures may help to transform 
the present-day cumbersome and inefficient economic system 
into an efficiently operating market mechanism. 
In externa! economic relations, substantial changes are 
needed both in material and administrative arrangements. In 
the first place, i t will be necessary te overcome the 
eMisting detachment 1rom the world markets and eMPose the 
producers to external competition and the consumers to Morid 
supply. The first step towards this goal should be the 
, 
introdLI.ction of interna 1 convertibi 1 i t y c·1 the Czecho-Slovak 
currenc)'.b/ lt is assumed that a relatively low total 
indebtedness of the CSFR estimated at 7,6 mld USD and the 
6/ Results 01 the IMF-Mission Report in the CSFR 1rom May 
26, 1990 to May 25, 1990, assume a considerable probabi-
lit y 01 a successful economic re10rm by the Government 
01 National Concensus. The introduction of internal conver-
tibility should be preceded by the CSFR"s return to the IMF 
and the World Bank . 
• 
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internal ha..-d eu..-..-eney and gold reserves (2,1 mld 
USO), eould, along with the expeeted loans f..-om wo..-ld banks 
in value 1,8 mld USO, help to overcome the fi..-st "shock" and 
thus avoid of development, i.e. 
a vicious ei..-ele of debts and inflation. 7 / 
The st..-ategy of a ..-adieal economic ..-efo..-m of the 
Czeeho-Slovak economy, as submitted by the gove..-nment in 
Ap..-il 1990, includes the assumption that the fo..-me..-
eent..-ally planned economies will eonstitute, to a s..-eBt 
extent, the ..-egion with whieh a significant pa..-t 01 fo..-eign 
t..-ade will be ca..-..-ied on even in the futu..-e. 
Howeve..-, the cha..-acte..- of the CMEA g..-ouping has to 
change. lf it does su..-vive its nume..-ous inte..-nal diseo..-ds 
it could change into some othe..- type of inte..-national 
community, e.g. a kind of Easte..-n OECD. Fu..-the..- development 
of the Czeeho-Slovak economy will conside..-ably depend on 
how effieiently the CSFR's majo..- pa..-tne..-, i.e. the Soviet 
Union, manages te cope with the economic reformo The Soviet 
Union's immense domestic ma..-ket means an important 
perspect.i,.ve for Czecho-Sloval; f irms even ir, the future. 
7/ Offieial data indicate the deerease in the ..-ate of 
inflation ~ in Poland below 5 1, but the total 
indebtedness rose UP over 40 mld USO, and without being 
eonverted it may be liquid only theoretieally • 
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As a result of the transition to joint clearing in 
convertible currencies between the two partners aiter Jan.l, 
1991, the existing trade ties and signi1icant relations w111 
be polarized and may even be reduced. 
What remains as a disputable issue is the new trade er 
commercial policy Di the unified Germany, which will have 
become a member cd th~ European space and may 11 pl ?.'y the 
first fiddle l' in it, as well as in the EEC. It cannot, 
however, be predicted which e1 the foreign economic ties 
with the CSFR will be meuntained. 
In accordance with the deliberations oi the CSFR 
90vernment, three important systems meaSures are to be 
adopted by government policy. It is from them that the 
10110wing transition to the market mechanism should evolve: 
liberalization 01 10reign-trade economic relations enabling 
a let 01 1irms to participate in international trade, 
- implementation of the pelicy of de-regulation, i. E? 
eliminating state intervention" in v~lue relations and 
reffic¡vi"rlg ar. artificial increase Di'" decrease in prices e·f 
resources Oí finished products, taking measures towards 
introducing internal convertibility of the Cs Crown 
in line with existing comparative advantages, 
small and big - scal. privatization oi state property. 
The main aim 01 the state policy in 10reign trade will 
be as follows: 
_ securing a suificient market for Czecho-Slovak exports and 
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paving the way 1o~ ent~y to ma~kets in the EEC, EFTA, USA 
and newly-indust~ialized count~ies, and p~ese~ving the 
ma~kets in the CMEA membe~ count~ies and those in China; 
10~mulating and taking measu~es in te~ms 01 comme~cial 
policy to secu~e sufficient and stable supplie~s of ene~gy 
and ~aw mate~ials, dive~sified so that supplies may not be 
easily dis~upted by economic or political changesl. 
promoting the increase in export efficiency 01 the 
rlational eeonomy through mate~ial and psychologieal 
stimulation 01 producers and exporters, and by creating 
a system 01 engineering, consulting and statistieal 
serviceE.; 
e~eating systems 01 quality eont~ol for exports and 
applying them e1fieiently. 
The methods are to be analogous to with those applied in 
Japan and ·Korea, 
eneouraging the flow of foreign eapital into ou~ eeonomy 
and ereating eonditions for our investment poliey in other 
lt is obvious that the overall strategy of the eeonomic 
, 
reform must constitute a sophisticated set 01 measures, 
providing options, since there a,-e sQme limite. 
Toreeasting the nature e·f the ne", economie behaviour e.f the 
eeonomy and the way economie subjeets I'li 11 react to the 
exte~nal or internal environment. 
The ~ep~esentatives of the mentioned IMF - Mission 
pointed on that even the most radical eeonomic ~eforms had 
failed when tl'le PLlblie and politicians had been 
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insuffieiently informed 01 the outeomes 01 those reforms, 
and not beeause oi an inadequate preparation of the reforms. 
The following data are mentioned for the sake ~f 
eomparison: Switzerland's imports reaehed 39,5 mil. tons of 
merehandise (v.lue: over 1000 USO/tI and her exports amounted 
to 6,1 mil tons (v.lue: 5500 USO/tI. The flow oi exports and 
imports with a volume 01 about 46 mil. tons generates 
turnover with • value of about 75 mld USO. Tne 40 X lower 
material inputs, in the case 01 Switzerland, generate 80 X 
higher appreei.tion in eomparison with Czeeho-Slov.kia. 
The economic restructuring being introduced by the 
Czeehoslovak reform is the basie prerequisite oi surmounting 
the struetur.l deformities whieh aeeumulated over the years, 
resulting in ehronie disproportions and inefieeitve 
relationships, whieh prevented a rational and dynamic 
development of the eountry's national eeonomy. Therefore a 
prepored transformation in Czechoslovakia c?nnot be a mere 
analogy 01 the structural changes carried out by the 
economically advanced countries in ,the 197C¡s and partl)' the 
1980s, b~t it must be a profound and comprehensive operation 
thBt will Bffect the industry, agriculture, eonstruction, 
transport , telecommunications and services directly 
influencing the domestic cansumer market , 
health serviee and education. 
as well as the 
According to the qualified esti~ates imports 01 
high-teeh irom advaneed capitalist countries would represent 
in the iirst stage some USD 16,000 million worth of 
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investments into this country's manufacturing industry, 
of which 7,000 million would go to the engineering industry 
Considering, Czechoslovakia's limited possibilities for 
exports, the question arises of how to generate the funds 
needed to cover such imports. A certain solution is 
cooperation with companies in advanced capitalits states. 
Its extent might grow from today's one to three per cent 
gradually up te 25 to 30 per cent by the year 2000, and 50 
to 60 per cent in the following decade. 
The plans concerning the exports to western countries 
are te a certain degree, on the aboye need to import 
high-tech from them. this is why non-socialist countries 
share of Czechoslovakia's engineering exports should go up 
from the 9,5 per cent today about 30 oer cent in the first 
decade of the next century. 
, 
IV. Scenario of Socio-Economic Reform 
---------------------------------
A number 01 findings from preceding analyses of our 
soc~al development results in the conclusion that the 
further socio-economic development to a morally healthy and 
all-round prosperous society may only lead through: 
al building a political system of a free democratic 
society, 
/ 
b/ implementing an economic programme which enables the 
transition 01 our society to a modern market economy. 
The initial basis 10r restructuring our new political 
system has been created bY adopting new acts of law as well 
as by the rise 01 a pluralistic political system. The path to 
the building 01 a new social order cannot, of course, take a 
smooth course, but in spite of this fact, it helps to define 
the chief trends and objectivES of social reform as a basis 
for formulating our economic programme. 
The introduction of this programme, requires in the 
first place B decision on basic meBsures to be taken, so 
that the transition to the market system does not end UP 
with the worst variant, or a kind of hybrid of centrally 
planned and market economies, bringing to life only the 
worse aspects of both 01 these economies, i.e. economic 
inefficiency and social breakdowns. The programme of the 
economic tr¿,nsformation propased cansists . .Df a set of 
• 
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measures, the following being the most important ones: priee 
deeontrol, export import liberalization and internal 
eonvertibility, 
sector (small 
promoting the development 01 the private 
seale and middle seale privatizationl, 
maero-eeonomie anti-inflation poliey, a poliey of social 
quarantees and of environmental proteetion and restoration. 
In the Seenario of eeonomie reform submitted by the 
CSFR Government on Sept. 4, 1990 for publie diseussion, the 
reform measures are split into two parts: 
- first, creation 01 a macro-economic framework, 
- secondly, micro-economic reform measures. 
The basie role 01 maero-eeonomie stabilization poliey 
1s the formation of the kind of eeonomie environment in 
whieh the neeessary ehange in the mierosphere, aeeompanied 
with the ehanges in priee struetures, will not result in 
inereasing global disequilibrium, in rapid inflation, or B 
disproportionate growth of indebtedness. All the other 
macro-economic objectives i.e. economic growth, employment 
and equilibrium of the balance of payments, have to be 
subordinated to th1s. 
The finaneial poliey is assumed to strive for a 
deereasing share of expenses of the state-budget in national 
ineome, namely through deereasing subsidies to the eorporate 
sphere of state firms and enterprises while supporting 
private business and deereasing national eonsumption • 
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The purpose of taxation reform, scheduled in several 
stages, is the formation of a new taxation system, 
interconnecting the incomes and expenditures of the sta te 
budget with the development of Gross Domestic Product, 
decreasing tax rates to the level current in countries with 
a market economy, creating the cerresponding conditions fer 
competition and promoting socially desirable entrepreneurial 
activities. 
One of the basic aims 01 macro-ecenomic paliey i5 
liberalization 01 foreign trade. Foreign competitio~ should 
become an effective regulator 01 liberalized prices 2nd an 
external motor force to boost the effectivness 01 domestic 
production. The main liberalization steps are: 
1. Widening the range of business activities and 
libaralizing the export and import programs of foraign 
trade organizations; 
2. Creating legislativa, and fOllow-up organizational 
prerequisites ter enabling Czechoslovak produc~r5 and 
final usars of imported products to become directly 
involyed in foreign trade activities; 
3. Creating legislativa, 2nd fOllow-up organizEtional 
prerequisites for increasing the number and type of 
subjects pursuing foreign trade activities; 
4. Creating conditions for the access of foreign companies 
to the Czechoslovak market; 
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5. Chan9ing 9radually the structure of the ownership forms 
of organizations whose main object 01 business i5 the 
carryin9 out of forei9n trade activities; 
6. Suppressin9. or eliminating the state's interference >n 
foreign tr8de activities by imposing binding tasks upon 
organ iza tionE-, or by centrally re-distributin9 forei;n 
e~-~change, etc. 
7. Introdllcing terms 01 payment L\supl abrecad in domest:(: 
r-elations, including the coverage 01 exchange rete 
dif1erences, entrepreneurial r-isks, settlement Di direct 
foreign commercial expenses. 
The scenario 01 economic .reform assumes that cne cf 
the decisive components which would directly determine the 
result oi the whole process will be the change in property 
relation=· in the Czecho-Slovak economy. So 1ar, there has 
been a complete predominance of public or state ownership, 
while the share 01 each citizen in its creation and use W~S 
not identifiable. The besis Di a functioning market economy 
is, hOvJever, the private ownership oi the meanE· of 
production. Consequently, in order to achieve an eS5enti~1 
, 
changeover, the government programme an acceleration Di the 
proces,ses oi de-nationalization and privatization 
assummed. The startin9-point 01 these processes will the 
adoption 01 the so-called transformation law. 
The share of the private sector in the Czecho-Slovak 
economy will increase in two crucial ways: 
- 37 -
through the entry and growth of new private entrepreneurs 
and firms in the economy, 
through privatization, i.e. the sale of the property 
al¡ocated to present-day state enterprises to private 
personsSJ • 
It is expected that one of the most important sources 
intensive increase in product lines, servicEs and in 
economic growth will be expanding small and medium-si:ed 
firms. The opening UP 01 markets and rapid domestic 
adaptation to the impulses 'of high technology, as well aE 
new technologies, can not be impemented under our conditions 
without finding a suitable place in the economy. 
One of the beams 01 economic reform should be price 
decontrol. The hither to prevailing deformed pricing 
systems, which were administratively established, are not 
capable 01 supplying economic entities with information on 
demand and supply in the market or concerning natural 
resources, etc. Price decontrel started sine e Jan. 1. 1991 
aims, therefore, at removing the obstacles to price-setting 
8/ The subject of small scale and middle scale privatization 
are so-called operations units i.e. those parts 01 state 
owned organizations that can be used for independent 
business. Thanks to their smoller size extent 01 
property and number 01 emplo)'ees, these units have good 
prerequisities fer being beught by private enterpreneurs 
in Czecho-Slovakia. This is importent in the situation in 
which private businesses only emerging in Czecho-Slovakia, 
and private enterpreneuers have only very limited 
posibilities for capital investment. What should not be 
on sale are those operations units, the separations of 
which from state owned organization in question would 
impair the latters activities in sofor the organization 
would not be able to honor its commitenent vis-a-vis 
partners. 
; 
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on the basis of efficient allocation by demando It is going 
to develop in dependence on the extent 01 the liberalization 
01 the imports achieved, i.e. of the rate Di 
demonopolisation. It is only afterwards that it will be 
possible to approach a complete price 6econtrol and relax 
the monetary regulation of incomes without major 
constraints. The expected rate of inflation should be 
dampened by a restrictive financia} and fiscal policy and a 
tough wage policy. Efficient supplement6ry instruments may, 
be found also in pricing and exchange-rate policies. 
Opening the economy to intern~tional competition 
however, a change in management 01 exchange-rate relations 
and a flexible approach 01 domestic fi~ms to herd currency 
on the basis oi equal rights. This can only be achieved by 
internal convertibility of the Czecho-Slovak currency. This 
will enable real competitive pressures on d6mestic producers 
and establishing equilibrium relationships between prices. 
The final aim is, in accordance with Article VIII, Treaty 
with the IMF, a complete convertibility cf the Czecho-Slovak 
currency. 
The concept ot the programme 01 internal convertibility 
is based on the iollowing: 
obligatory sale of hard currency ior External payments to 
bank and the possibility 01 a free purchase of hard 
currency irom banks in Czecho-Slovak crowns, to be used 
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application of a unified exchange rate created On the 
basis of demand and supply on the foreign-exchange market; 
- eliminating foreign currencies circulating in the Czechc-
Slovak economy; 
regulation of equilibrium in exchange rate relations b~ 
mBcroeconomic interventions from the central government; 
supporting export performance by a suitable taNaticn and 
credit stimulation 01 those production structures, wh~ch 
will be able to secure a sufficient creation 01 h~rc 
currency through a higher export guota; 
intervention of the central bank on the foreign-currency 
market, enabling a longer-term stabilization 01 the 
e>,change rateo 
The structural policy backing the economic reform will 
be based on the application of comparative advantages of ths 
Czecho-Slovak economy, i. e. on the conditions of its 
ef1icient involvement in international trade. The following 
are major trends in the structural policy: 
- limitation 01 heavy industry and promotion Di traditional 
and prospective activities of light industry; 
, 
- decreasing the consumption Di energy and raw materials iG 
product10n and reducing its unfavourable impact on ecol~;~; 
strengthening the tertiary sector, mainly in tourism, 
services, banking, insurance and ·turis·t institutions; 
renewal 01 economic growth and entrepreneurial activities, 
mainly in the private sector; 
developing of foreign tourism; 
• 
• 
• 
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introducing information systems in the society, including 
telecommunication infrastructure; 
compensBting and 
environment; 
repairing the damage made to the 
development of transportation facilities and the like. 
The scenario 01 economic re10rm cannot be implemented 
smoothly, i.e. free 01 2ny problems and a considerable 
tension in the social area. Even i1 there are e110rts to 
minimize the un1avourable heritage 01 the previous 
development. characteristics 01 the labour supply exceeding 
the number 01 vacancies, the problems 01 ine1ficient 
overemployment. poor work discipline and low productivity 01 
labour can only be eliminated gradually in the years to 
come . 
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v. EPI L O G 
On New Year's day the Czechoslovak koruna was 
effectively devalued by 14,25 per cent to around II( to the 
dellar fellowing a 50 per cent devaluation in October. The 
currency was also made internally convertible and most 
ioreign trade restrictions were liited in line with promises 
made te the International Monetary Fund. 
"8mall privatisation ll plan. designed to convert more 
tharr 100 000 shops, service stationE 2nd other 5mall 
businesses to private ownership over this year is due to 
come into efiect. 
The government has also drawn UP tax measures designed 
te keep wage and salary growth well below en inflation rete 
which sorne economists believE could 90 as high as 3(1 per 
cent thiE" year. 
The net result ei devaluetien. price liberalisatien, 
widespre-ad privatisation, a further sharp drop in Corneeon 
trade, higher oil pricEs 2nd wage controls will be a further 
5 per cent drop in GDP this yeer. GDP 1el1 by around 3,5 pEr 
cent. Unemplc,yment is e>:pected to rise irom abOL\t 3(> 000 ",t 
present to 400 000 or more bythe end Di the year. 
//1/11/1"" /1111 II~ 'l/li¡il"ifil1j¡~IIiII""' "'/ ,,/1 
5307406580 
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Cln the other hand Czechoslovakia's industrial 
traditions, geographical proximity to the rich markets 01 
the European Community and commitnent to a market system 
have aIready attracted the first large strategic 
investments. The most important is Vo 1 k S>la ger. ' s USD 
6,45 b~llion DM deal >lith Skoda. The value 01 the 10reign 
investment in Czecho-Slovakia ammounded t0gether almost le) 
billion DM. This way could be ene 01 most important 
assumptions 01 the comeback 01 our country among the 
developed countries 01 Europe. 
